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Information-Sharing and Cross-Border Entry 
in European Banking 
ECRI Research Report No. 11/February 2010 
Caterina Giannetti, Nicola Jentzsch and Giancarlo Spagnolo 
1. Introduction 
Asymmetrically distributed information and adversely selected pools of borrowers constitute 
severe barriers for foreign banks when they enter new markets. In many instances, these 
problems force banks to either form ‘alliances with incumbents’ or simply enter through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Yet such entry modes do not automatically lead to 
intensified competition as they may leave the number of competitors unchanged. Thus, 
institutions that reduce information asymmetries in credit markets (thereby encouraging entry 
through branches) may be very important if the objective is strengthening competition in 
addition to market integration. Recently, these institutions – credit registers – have received 
greater attention among academics and policy-makers in Europe, although there is still a 
remarkable lack of understanding of their empirical impact on banking. 
Information sharing through public registers or private credit bureaus (we use the term ‘credit 
registers’ for both) collect and distribute millions of profiles (credit histories) on individuals and 
companies in European credit markets. Their contribution to credit market performance is 
typically rated positively in the economic literature: information asymmetries are reduced, as 
are moral hazard and credit rationing, among other problems plaguing credit markets. For these 
reasons, credit-reporting systems play an essential role in banking, related to transparency, 
banking system stability, and the reduction of screening and monitoring costs for banks as well 
as competition. 
While there are many studies on the main drivers of the cross-border expansion of banks, less is 
known about the effects credit registers have on international banking in terms of their ability to 
facilitate cross-border market entry. This is of special interest, because in the past, extensive 
literature has identified a broad variety of factors that have an impact on cross-border expansion 
– except for information asymmetries on borrowers. Where credit registers enable foreign banks 
to access data on an equal basis with local incumbents, they reduce exogenous information 
asymmetries through the exchange of ‘hard information’ on borrowers. Endogenous 
asymmetries, on the other hand, are based upon ‘soft information’ from relationship lending in a 
market and despite credit reporting, they continue to persist. 
Banks can choose to penetrate another market in different ways, among them cross-border 
service provision or the setting-up of a ‘commercial presence’. The latter can take place through 
branching, an M&A, a de novo (greenfield) investment or the opening of a representative office. 
This report focuses on M&As and branching (de novo investments and representative offices are 
not subjects of our analysis). A branch is defined as an unincorporated entity without 
independent legal status that is wholly owned by the parent company.
1 An M&A, on the other 
hand, is here defined as the strategy of penetrating a market by buying another legal entity in the 
target jurisdiction (whereas a de novo or greenfield investment is setting up a wholly new 
entity). Although domestic M&As in financial services have increased steadily over the past 
two decades, the number of cross-border M&A deals in the euro area has declined from 2004 to 
                                                      
1 Derived from ECB, Guideline of the European Central Bank of 1 August 2007 on monetary, financial 
institutions and markets statistics (recast) (ECB/2007/9), OJ L 341/1, 27.12.2007. 2 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
2008. In general, for all modes of cross-border movements of banks, information asymmetries 
are of great importance. When potential newcomers are unable to access the credit histories of 
borrowers in a target market, they incur the risk of incorrectly estimating a borrower’s credit 
risk, which may result in the incorrect pricing of the services offered. Credit histories, for 
instance, could be inaccessible on a cross-border basis if there is no national presence or in 
cases where a non-bank financial institution needs to obtain a bank license in order to access 
information from the database. These situations put them at a competitive disadvantage 
compared with the incumbents. Furthermore, monitoring and scoring technologies are in many 
cases not exportable because of the different information environments that render various 
predictors for creditworthiness. Depending on the severity of the problem, an entrant might 
choose to enter by acquiring a local bank or in the extreme case may choose not to enter at all. 
Credit registers exist in every EU member state, but the credit reporting systems have evolved 
quite differently across Europe. This has been documented in earlier work of the European 
Credit Research Institute (ECRI) by Jentzsch (2007) and San Jose Riestra (2002), as well as in 
Jentzsch & San Jose Riestra (2006). While public credit registers are typically in the ownership 
of a central bank and are part of its supervisory and reporting structure, private credit bureaus 
are for-profit institutions used for commercial lending, creditworthiness and affordability tests 
as well as ongoing borrower monitoring.  
It is important to note this distinction between credit bureaus as profit-maximising private-
sector entities and public credit registers, which are part of the central banks. Both kinds of 
institutions can hold information on companies and individuals, and co-exist in countries such 
as Germany, Austria and Italy. There are further differences in terms of reporting thresholds and 
the kinds of data collected. Positive information covers contractually compliant behaviour and 
includes (depending on the country) information about outstanding types of credit, the amounts 
of loans and repayment patterns. Negative information generally consists of statements about 
default or arrears and bankruptcy. For instance, in France, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Malta and 
Spain, only negative information is collected on individuals. In such regimes, market 
newcomers can only observe an adversely selected pool of borrowers from the negative data. In 
other countries, both positive and negative information is collected and distributed (examples 
are the UK, Germany and Ireland).  
At the EU level, credit registers are subject to the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) 
(European Council, 1995) and the Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC) (European Council, 
2008). At the national level, they are subject to bank laws or the central bank act along with any 
further data protection laws. The concern that credit bureaus could be used to discriminate 
against foreign banks is reflected in the Consumer Credit Directive, with Art. 9 stating that each 
member state should ensure that “in the case of cross-border credit...access for creditors from 
other Member States to databases used in that Member State for assessing the creditworthiness 
of consumers...shall be non-discriminatory”. In 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled 
on the compatibility of the data exchange system in Spain with Community competition law. In 
the ruling, the Court stated that compatibility depends on the economic conditions in the 
relevant market, the specific characteristics of the system (its purpose and access conditions) 
and the kind of information exchanged. It argued that information exchange on borrowers is 
permissible if the relevant market is not highly concentrated, the system does not allow lenders 
to be identified and the conditions of access to the system are non-discriminatory. Only 
recently, the diversity of credit reporting systems in Europe has attracted the attention of 
Directorate-General (DG) for Competition of the European Commission. In its retail banking 
inquiry of 2006, the Commission held that three key aspects are relevant: unfair and 
discriminatory access conditions for foreigners, partial information sharing and regulatory 
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barriers. For instance, barriers to the register are deemed to exist if an entity must have a 
physical presence in the country or comply with reciprocity principles in order to access the 
credit register. 
Cross-border credit reporting is in a nascent state for consumer credit, but is much further 
developed for cross-border wholesale loans, where it falls under the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) for public credit registers of the European Central Bank (European 
Central Bank, 2003). As of 2009, there was no exchange of information on retail lending under 
this agreement, although the MOU covers both. The reason is that companies are better 
identifiable and demand greater loan volumes, which increases the need for banks to share 
exposure information. To find ways to facilitate cross-border data exchange on individuals, the 
European Commission mandated the Expert Group on Credit Histories to make suitable 
recommendations, collated in a report published in 2009. 
Some private credit bureaus do have cross-border bilateral contracts with their counterparts in 
other countries (such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, or Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark). The volumes of cross-border exchanges on individuals are low and occur almost 
solely in areas that share a common language (e.g. Germany and Austria). In addition, private 
business reports are distributed Europe-wide through assorted private-sector networks.  
Although there has been rising interest among academics and policy-makers in information 
sharing, there has been little to no research shedding light on credit reporting and bank entry 
modes (branching and M&As) in Europe. This interaction is of importance as it could guide 
policy-making intended to further EU banking integration. We hope to close this knowledge gap 
at least partly by presenting a new dataset on EU-27 countries for the years 1990–2007, which 
combines information on credit reporting systems and market entry by banks through M&As 
and branching. We then use it to understand what effects the establishment of credit registers 
has had on different modes of entry in these countries, and which kind of information exchange 
is needed to foster cross-border branching versus cross-border M&As. 
Our working hypothesis is that where insufficient information-providing institutions exist, the 
preferred mode of entry will be an M&A, which allows with the acquisition of the target bank 
simultaneous access to the information the latter has on the local pool of borrowers. Once 
adequate mechanisms of information exchange are available, branching ought to become the 
more attractive if not preferred entry mode, as information asymmetries diminish. 
The remainder of this ECRI research report is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide a 
brief snapshot of the state of integration in the EU banking market. Section 3 outlines the role of 
credit reporting in Europe. Section 4 discusses the interrelation between credit reporting and 
bank competition. Section 5 discusses the latest theoretical and empirical advances on analysing 
the subject matter. Section 6 presents the dataset and section 7 the econometric analysis. Section 
8 concludes. 
2.  A snapshot of integration in European banking  
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the current state of banking integration in the 
euro area. We discuss the measurement of financial integration and explain why some of the 
modes of cross-border service provision were excluded from this study. Financial integration in 
Europe is uneven across market segments.
2 According to the ECB, banking markets encompass 
interbank (wholesale), capital market-related and retail banking activities. The first two show 
                                                      
2 Financial markets encompass money markets, bond markets, equity and banking markets. In this 
section, we concentrate on the latter. 4 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
signs of increased integration, whereas the latter remain rather fragmented (European Central 
Bank, 2009).  
The integration of retail banking services can take place in different ways (see Box 1), for 
instance through either direct provision of services across borders or foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which is discussed further below. For the purpose of this study, of the four modes in Box 
1, only one is important: commercial presence. The other modes can be excluded given that we 
are interested in cross-border M&As and branches. 
Box 1. International financial services provision 
Credit reporting can have a differential impact on financial market integration. Practically, retail 
financial services can be provided in one of the following modes:  
•  cross-border service provision, i.e. crossing borders during provision (such as cross-border 
Internet banking);  
•  consumption abroad, i.e. consumers who travel to another member state to use the services 
provided there (short-term consumption of services); 
•  commercial presence, i.e. FDI in terms of establishing a local presence (M&As, de novo 
investments, branches of providers and representative offices); and 
•  the presence of natural persons, i.e. individuals who travel abroad to offer a service in another 
country (such as consultants or credit brokers). 
Although credit reporting can potentially affect all of these modes, we focus our analysis on the 
commercial presence and regard the other modes of minor relevance.  
Financial integration is typically measured by a number of banking indicators that are either 
price- or quantity-based (Adam et al., 2002) and infrastructure indicators for payment systems. 
These show that retail banking essentially remains fragmented along national borders. The 
integration in this market segment has been described as one of the “biggest disappointments of 
European integration” for policy-makers (Lannoo, 2008). For instance, market structures still 
differ; savings, credit, and investment attitudes follow diverse patterns; consumer and investor 
protection measures vary; and language and habits diverge. Nevertheless, before embarking on a 
deeper investigation of bank commercial presence, it is also worth noticing the integration 
trends in the provision of cross-border services.
3 
2.1  Cross-border provision of financial services 
The cross-border provision of financial services has increased in the past few years in Europe. 
The ECB reports this as a “medium-term gradual trend towards integration, but [it] also show[s] 
signs of a setback in the second half of 2008, in particular in the interbank components” 
(European Central Bank, 2009, p. 40). Figure 1 shows that the share of cross-border MFI loans 
in the euro area that have been granted to non-MFIs has risen from above 2% of total loans in 
1997 to 5.3% by December 2008, according to the numbers of the ECB. This measure is 
aggregated and it represents loans to the private sector (corporate and household loans) and to 
governments. The corporate segment makes up the larger share of the overall number compared 
with the share of lending to households.
4 
                                                      
3 In the following discussion, only data for the euro area are provided (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia 
and Finland), as no other data were available in a consolidated format. 
4 Disaggregated information is not available. INFORMATION-SHARING AND CROSS-BORDER BANK ENTRIES | 5 
 
Figure 1. Cross-border MFI loans to non-MFIs – Outstanding amounts by residency of the 
counterpart (%) 
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Source: ECB (2009).  
 
The lack of market integration in retail banking in the euro area reflects the local business 
character of retail banking, where proximity to clients is key and demands a pervasive branch 
network.  
Clients typically choose a bank close to where they work or live, and tend to cluster services at 
one provider, although within borders the latter tendency decreases. The local character of retail 
banking places an increased importance on entering through branches or M&As. Such an entry 
mode allows the establishment of a local presence to gain proximity to customers. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the recent financial turmoil might have led to less eagerness 
on the part of banks to lend away from their home countries in other markets and limited 
interest from consumers in obtaining financial services in other countries.
5  
2.2  Commercial presence: Foreign direct investment  
Commercial institutions have different options for entering foreign markets. FDI encompasses 
all the activities that lead to the establishment of a local presence in another country (i.e. M&As, 
de novo investments, branches and representative offices). Still, market entry in banking in 
Europe is primarily conducted through M&As. M&As differ from de novo (or greenfield) 
investments, in that they entail the purchase of an existing bank and not the set-up of a wholly 
new institution. The number of cross-border M&As is often seen as an indicator of more 
                                                      
5 Highly publicised cases such as the default of Icelandic banks that had attracted foreign depositors 
might have had an impact on consumers’ perceptions of the risks of conducting business with institutions 
located in another country. 6 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
integrated markets, together with the indicator on the development of foreign branches and 
subsidiaries of euro area banks (credit institutions) within euro area countries. M&As are 
typically conducted to obtain the client portfolio and with it access to client information, but 
also to acquire the branch network and the proximity to clients. Figure 2 shows the value and 
numbers of cross-border deals in the euro area. 
Figure 2. M&A activity among cross-border banks in the euro area 
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Notes: Cross-border bank M&A activity in the euro area as a percentage of the total value of 
euro-area banking sector M&As (left-hand scale) and in absolute numbers (right-hand scale).  
Source: ECB (2009). 
 
It remains an open question whether the current financial crisis has increased the number of 
M&A deals as weak institutions have sought greater stability offered by the better-capitalised 
banks. Another mode of entry for national presence is setting up bank branches. Branches are 
unincorporated entities without independent legal status, wholly owned by their parent.
6 
Branches located in the euro area of institutions that do not have a registered office in the euro 
area are also subject to the euro system’s minimum reserve requirements. Any number of places 
of business set up in the same member state by a credit institution with headquarters in another 
member state is regarded as a single branch (Directive 2006/48/EC). In addition, a host country 
may establish more requirements for opening a foreign branch than for a foreign-controlled 
subsidiary. Subsidiaries are separate incorporated entities in which another entity has a majority 
or full participation (ECB/2007/9). They can either be the result of a merger or a de novo 
investment. They are defined in Arts. 1 and 2 of Directive 83/349/EEC as an entity in which the 
parent has a majority of shares or member’s voting rights. Among other aspects, subsidiaries are 
often the result of crisis-related acquisitions (Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia & Martinez Peria, 2007). 
                                                      
6 ECB (2007), op. cit. INFORMATION-SHARING AND CROSS-BORDER BANK ENTRIES | 7 
 
In Europe, for example, the concept of a single banking license for branches within the EU, 
along with the principles of home-country control and home-country deposit insurance, make it 
possible to have competing banks in one country that have different deposit insurance coverage 
and are subject to different rules by home country law and regulation (Goldberg et al., 2005). 
Competition between banks subject to different rules is consistent with the principle of mutual 
recognition (of regulation and legislation).  
Dermine (2006) asserts that “it appears that [a] European bank operating abroad, exclusively 
with branches, is currently a myth”. He identifies eight reasons to explain the choice of 
subsidiary structure: four that are temporary in nature (protection of original brand, management 
trust, nationalistic feelings and shareholder approval), two that stem from an incomplete process 
of European integration (corporate tax and deposit insurance), and one with a permanent 
character (asymmetric information and risk shifting, listing and flexibility). Among the most 
common additional requirements are “the approval of the home-country foreign bank regulator, 
restrictions on specific activities (e.g. mortgage transactions) or on dealing with host-country 
residents, and a statement of the applicant foreign bank that it will be responsible for all branch 
claims” (Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia & Martinez Peria, 2007).  
Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia & Martinez Peria (2007) develop a host-country regulation index to take 
into account differences in host-country requirements for foreign branches and subsidiaries 
compared with the home country for Latin American and Eastern European countries.  
As noted earlier, given that these are the main cross-border modes of integration, we focus on 
M&As and branching. It is not possible to include data on cross-border loans from MFIs for the 
econometric part of this study.
7 These statistics are only available at the level of the counterpart 
(MFIs versus non-MFIs) and not at the country level. Therefore, it is not possible to identify the 
nationality of the bank and the nationality of the receiver of the financial service (ECB 
Regulation ECB/2001/13).  
3.  The role of credit reporting in Europe 
Credit registers exist in almost every European country and play an important role in national 
credit markets. In this section, we discuss their role in cross-border lending as well as the 
assessment made by the European Commission (DG Competition) in its retail sector inquiry.  
As noted earlier, in this report we subsume private credit bureaus and public credit registers 
under the term ‘credit register’. For private credit bureaus, we hereby employ a broad definition 
(institutions that conduct business reporting, consumer reporting and use debt collection 
activities in combination with credit reporting). Public credit registers are typically in the 
ownership of the central bank and part of its supervisory structure (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002; 
Jentzsch, 2007; Jentzsch & San Jose Riestra, 2006). Central banks use them for off-site bank 
supervision, whereas commercial banks may use them for borrower monitoring. The threshold 
for reporting loans varies across European countries (see European Commission, 2009, for an 
overview). Public credit registers exist in 14 countries in Europe.
8  
Private credit bureaus, on the other hand, exist in all member states. Credit bureaus are primarily 
voluntary information-sharing mechanisms with reporting thresholds below those of public 
                                                      
7 MFIs are defined as central banks, resident credit institutions and other resident financial institutions; 
see also the ECB’s “Explanatory notes on statistics on the Monetary Financial Institutions sector”, ECB, 
Frankfurt (2001). 
8 The majority of these registers were founded in the 1990s; Germany’s central bank register 
Evidenzzentrale fuer Millionenkredite has existed since 1934 for the prevention of systemic crisis in the 
banking sector. 8 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
registers. Private bureaus are used for commercial lending, creditworthiness and affordability 
tests as well as borrower monitoring (Crook, Thomas & Edelman, 2002; Thomas, 2000). They 
have become an integral part of the lending process (Brown, Jappelli & Pagano; 2008, Jappelli 
& Pagano, 2002).  
Credit scores are also used in downstream securitisation (Keys et al., 2008). Although they 
serve different purposes, public registers and credit bureaus have frequently been compared in 
the literature in the past in terms of their design and functions (Miller, 2003; Jentzsch, 2007). 
Both kinds of institutions can hold information on companies and individuals.  
At the EU level, credit registers are subject to the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), the 
Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC). At the national level, they are subject to bank laws or 
the central bank act and any other data protection laws. The Consumer Credit Directive holds in 
Art. 9 that each member state shall ensure that access for creditors from other member states to 
databases used for assessing creditworthiness is granted on non-discriminatory conditions. In 
light of Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty, discrimination is to “apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage”.
9 It is important to note that once there are different types of credit registers, 
depending on the coverage of loans in terms of reporting thresholds and the kinds of data 
collected, there might be market segments where reports from both sources (public and private) 
are substitutes from a lender’s perspective.  
Credit reporting systems strongly differ in terms of the information collected. For instance, in 
France, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Malta and Spain only negative information is collected on 
private individuals. In such regimes, market newcomers can only observe an adversely selected 
pool of borrowers as negative data is information on defaults, delinquencies or bankruptcies. 
Incumbent banks have the advantage of also processing positive information on their clients. In 
other countries, positive and negative information is collected and distributed (the UK, 
Germany and Ireland). Recently, the European Commission drew attention to credit registers in 
its retail banking inquiry.
10 The Commission held that three aspects are relevant concerning 
credit registers: unfair and discriminatory access conditions for foreigners, partial information 
sharing and regulatory barriers (see also Box 2). 
Box 2. Credit registers in the DG Competition’s retail sector inquiry 
The Commission stated that with regard to access, the following aspects are of special interest when 
considering the role of credit registers:  
•  the kind of activity that an institution must conduct to be able to enter the information-sharing 
mechanism,  
•  the condition of holding a bank license,  
•  physical presence in the country,  
•  compliance with reciprocity,  
•  compliance with data protection laws, and  
•  fee structure (joining fees, membership fees and transaction fees).  
                                                      
9 Likewise, similar conditions can be applied to dissimilar institutions, which may also qualify as 
discriminatory practice. 
10 See the European Commission report on the retail banking sector inquiry, the Commission Staff 
Working Document accompanying the Communication on Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation 
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While some of these conditions are justifiable, others may lead to discriminatory access. It was 
stated that in most cases, members of credit registers are required to be credit providers. The 
requirement to hold a bank license and to be nationally present is adopted by some public credit 
registers (Austria, Spain, Portugal and Latvia). It automatically derives from the application 
scope of the relevant law (which is national and therefore, in essence, can only be applied to the 
territory of the state).
11 The cross-border exchange of credit reports (on individuals) between 
credit registers is very limited among private credit bureaus. Exchanges are far more common 
among public credit registers in Europe, although such exchanges only cover companies at 
present. Bilateral cross-border contracts among credit bureaus exists for companies in Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as in Sweden, Finland and Denmark (see Figures 
3a and 3b).  
In Figure 3a, some indications of cross-border reporting among private credit bureaus are 
provided. One of the highest volumes of exchanges is between Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, owing to the cross-border traffic of natural persons that take up credit in the other 
country. Overall, the volumes of cross-border exchanges are low – around a few hundred reports 
per year – and occur especially where there is a common language (for instance, Germany and 
Austria).  
Figure 3. Cross-border reporting in Europe 
Figure 3a. Reporting among private bureaus  Figure 3b. Public register reporting on companies 
 
Source: ACCIS.  Source: Bank of Portugal. 
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In Figure 3b, the exchange between public registers under the ECB’s MOU is presented.
12 
Cross-border wholesale credit reporting exists under the MOU primarily for a sub-set of public 
credit registers. As of 2009, there was no exchange of information on retail lending, although 
the MOU covers both.
13 The reason is that companies can be better identified and demand 
greater volumes of credit, which increases the banks’ need to share exposure information across 
borders. The quality and costs for accessing credit data vary considerably across Europe. 
Moreover, while in some cases there is a legal obligation to report, in others reporting is 
voluntary.  
4.  Credit reporting and bank competition 
Information sharing, market structure and competitive conduct are intrinsically linked in 
banking. According to the theoretical literature, banks are at a disadvantage when entering a 
new market because the incumbents have proprietary information about borrowers’ 
characteristics that allows them to better cope with risk problems. In particular, ‘soft 
information’ on borrowers (so-called ‘endogenous information’) collected from the lending 
relationship encompasses income inflows on the account and expenditure outflows, i.e. 
information that is typically not reported through credit bureaus. Information on repayment 
behaviour and defaults is ‘exogenous information’ reported to other market participants through 
the credit bureau. The adverse selection problem is greater for entrants as their pool of 
applicants might include borrowers who were previously rejected by incumbents.  
Therefore, from the viewpoint of industrial organisation, the upstream industry organisation of 
credit reporting can affect banks’ choice of entry modes, given that the elements characterising 
these systems determine the availability, the quality and the costs of access to crucial data by 
market participants. For instance, for cross-border credit reporting, reciprocity principles could 
be an obstacle: to avoid free-rider problems, credit registers require banks to supply their credit 
data concerning local borrowers (and sometimes national presence) as a condition for access to 
their data – a condition hard to meet for a foreign bank planning to enter a new market.
14 
As discussed above, banks can establish a presence in the target jurisdiction by establishing 
subsidiaries or branches. It can be argued that credit reporting as upstream information 
intermediation can have an impact on downstream competition among banks. If credit reporting 
affects the modes of entry of banks, it may well influence the intensity of competition among 
national providers. Different modes of entry will affect competition in varying ways. For 
example, entry through branching adds an additional player to the local incumbents, which is 
typically not the case for mergers, where ownership but not market structure changes (M&As 
involving more than one incumbent even reduce the number of competitors). 
The above discussion shows that there are horizontal as well as vertical relations that arise from 
information sharing. Theoretically, financial service providers might use credit bureaus for the 
strategic foreclosure of international competitors. This issue has recently been on the agenda of 
                                                      
12 See the ECB’s Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information among National 
Central Credit Registers for the Purpose of Passing it on to Reporting Institutions (20 February 2003), 
ECB, Frankfurt. 
13 As of October 2006, seven EU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) had signed the MOU. The Czech Republic and Romania are interested in signing the MOU in 
2009–10. 
14 In the case of cross-border reporting, the Expert Group (European Commission) states that in the most 
simple configuration, the principle of reciprocity is fulfilled if a country (country A) shares credit data 
with another one (country B), provided that the latter shares credit data with country A or the credit 
registers of both countries are either prepared to or actually exchange credit data. INFORMATION-SHARING AND CROSS-BORDER BANK ENTRIES | 11 
 
the European Commission. The Commission’s inquiry stated that fee structures set by credit 
bureaus could weaken competition in retail banking through high joining fees, discriminatory 
volume-based transaction fees and high fixed-transaction fees. For instance, joining fees range 
from €0 to €75,000 in Europe, with the highest fees observed for surveyed bureaus where banks 
are the owners (European Commission, 2007(b), p. 33).
15 Transaction fees also vary from €0 to 
€2, with an average of €0.46. Furthermore, partial data sharing occurs in two main situations:  
i)  where there is low market coverage by the register, and  
ii)  where information sharing is voluntary, institutions might have an incentive to 
strategically report incomplete information on their good clients to deter others from 
poaching them (Bouckaert & Degryse, 2006; Gehrig & Stenbacka, 2007).  
Banks might have an incentive not to disclose their complete portfolio of borrowers. In this 
scenario, they might choose strategically to disclose only some information on their borrowers 
or only parts of their portfolio. 
Cases of strategically incomplete reporting on borrowers have appeared in the US, where 14% 
of the consumers sampled had missing credit limits on one or more of their reported accounts 
and 47% had omissions that affected the credit records (Avery et al., 2004). Note that this would 
only be possible for private credit bureaus (and information exchange within associations). 
Strategic behaviour would not be possible within the network of public registers held by the 
central banks. The latter could punish such behaviour by providers by revoking the bank 
license.  
Reporting to private credit bureaus, however, is largely voluntary as noted above. Hence, this 
arrangement could be more prone to strategic behaviour. Credit bureaus may be caught in a 
conflict of interest: while they want to guarantee information that is as complete as possible, 
banks are also their clients, whom they do not want to lose. 
4.1  Horizontal relations  
The exchange of market-sensitive information between competitors is considered a grey area of 
competition law located at the intersection of the legitimate exchange of business information 
and anti-competitive collusion (Banker’s Ideanet, 2007). Horizontal relations arise where actual 
and potential competitors (located at the same level of the value chain) exchange knowledge on 
clients and potentially reduce market uncertainty with this exchange.
16 Information exchanges 
can take place for different reasons, among them efficiency concerns, risk monitoring or 
collusion (Bouckaert & Degryse, 2006; Gehrig & Stenbacka, 2007). In general, such exchanges 
ought to be assessed in the light of their potential anti-competitive effects (Vives, 2006, 2007).  
The European Commission (Obst, 2008) states that information sharing is a breach of Art. 81 of 
the EC Treaty if it reduces or abolishes uncertainty about market development and leads to a 
real or potential limitation of competition among companies. For instance, if financial 
institutions exchange information through an industry association, this could be regarded as 
‘concerted practice’ under Art. 81(1) EC Treaty.  
One example of association-based data exchange is in Italy (Consorzio per la Tutela del 
Credito). Other former associations have recently transformed into companies, such as ASNEF-
Equifax in Spain, Schufa Holding AG in Germany and KSV1870 in Austria. In Belgium, the 
                                                      
15 Cost data are not available for a time series. The cost data provided by DG Competition are 
anonymised.  
16 See the European Commission Notice – Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal 
cooperation agreements, OJ C 3, 6.1.2001. 12 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
Union Professionelle du Credit transferred its data-sharing mechanism, the Mutuelle 
d’Information sur le Risque, to the central bank. Horizontally, such associations could be used 
for setting discriminatory access standards for foreign banks, which can increase costs for 
market entry. If databases are located at the upstream stage of the value chain, e.g. in an 
upstream company, anticompetitive vertical relations may arise. 
In the past, the Commission adopted a block exemption regulation for the insurance sector, 
applied to certain agreements that might otherwise be found in breach of the competition law. 
This exemption expires in March 2010; currently the Commission is seeking consultation on 
renewal. The present exemption applies to the calculation or tables referring to risks, number of 
claims and total amounts payable (Capobianco, 2004, p. 1273). 
In  Asnef-Equifax v. Ausbanc (23 November 2006),
17 the ECJ issued a clarification of 
circumstances in which competitors may exchange information regarding the creditworthiness 
of their clients without infringing EU competition law (see also Houwen, 2008). “The case was 
referred by the Spanish High Court to the ECJ for a ruling on whether information exchange of 
the type in issue breached Article 81(1) EC and whether such an agreement could be authorised 
by a national competition authority under Article 81(3) EC if implementation of the agreement 
could benefit consumers” (OECD, 2008, p. 125). In particular, it was stated that the assessment 
of compatibility of the system (in Spain) with EU law must be judged based upon individual 
circumstances, including the economic conditions in the relevant markets, the characteristics of 
the system, the purpose and conditions of access, and the kind of information exchanged (see 
Box 3).  
 
Box 3. ECJ ruling on credit registers 
The ECJ ruled that information exchange such as that at issue in Spain is in principle permissible if 
•  relevant markets are not highly concentrated,  
•  the system does not allow lenders to be identified, and  
•  the conditions of access to the system are not discriminatory.  
At the same time, the judgment also stresses that for doubtful cases “there is no substitute for a 
rigorous analysis of the affected market in light of the case law and general guidance from the 
Commission and national competition authorities, before engaging in any potentially controversial 
activity such as information exchange” (Houwen, 2008, p. 108). 
It was held by the Court that the uncertainty associated with lending to customers is removed 
through information sharing in a way actually favouring competition. Our econometric results 
appear consistent with this claim. 
The ECJ left it to the national court to determine whether the conditions for an exemption under 
Art. 81(3) EC have been met, but stated that negative and positive effects of the arrangement 
must be balanced under Art. 81(3). In May 2006, the Council of Ministers approved a block 
exemption regulation for the exchange of information on non-performing debt.
18 There are a 
                                                      
17 See the Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 23 November 2006 in Case C-238/05, Asnef-
Equifax, Servicios de Informacion sobre Solvencia y Credito, SL v. Asociacion de Usuarios de Servicios 
Bancarios (Ausbanc), [2006] ECR I-11125. 
18 See the Royal Decree 602/2006 of 19 May 2006 approving a block exemption regulation for certain 
categories of agreements for the exchange of information on non-performing debt (Official State Gazette 
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number of conditions that are to be fulfilled for the register to qualify for an exemption. For 
instance, if the three main providers have a combined market share of over 50%, the exemption 
cannot be applied, as the level of competition would be regarded as low.  
4.2 Vertical  relations 
Vertical agreements refer to those between two or more undertakings, each of which operate at a 
different level of the value chain for the purpose of the agreement.
19 These agreements arise 
where data is shared with a credit bureau, which provides data collection and analysis services 
as an input for downstream retail banking. Banks that do not have access to the data pooled 
upstream may experience a worsening of their risk prediction capacity, as stated. In large 
portfolios, this can quickly turn into loan losses in the millions.
 Such a risk may discourage 
entry or make outside banks more willing to acquire shares in local banks. Once owned or 
managed by dominant players, a credit bureau could be used as ‘concerted practice’ to raise 
rivals’ costs. This can occur on two levels: downstream for market newcomers in banking, but 
also upstream for rival credit bureaus that cannot obtain data from banks. For instance, in 
Germany, bank data is only pooled by the Schufa Holding AG and there are several other 
countries where only one bureau pools information on bank clients (see European Commission, 
2009, p. 12). Access to this ‘bottleneck input’ (i.e. bank credit data) could be denied or made 
difficult for competitors. For anti-competitive vertical foreclosure, however, parties need to 
have market power at the stage of the value chain in question. The potential anti-competitive 
effects of information sharing is exemplified by a Mexican case, where in the 1990s, the 
Mexican Bank Association formed a private credit bureau (Buro de Credito) in partnership with 
D&B and TransUnion. The two firms that have attempted to set up competing credit bureaus 
have found it impossible to obtain information from the banks. Essentially, banks became 
vertically integrated with a monopolistic credit bureau with which they had an exclusivity deal 
(Jappelli & Pagano, 2000).  
5.  Theoretical and empirical insights on information sharing 
5.1 Theory 
A thriving theoretical literature on information sharing and credit market performance has 
developed. These theoretical works are surveyed in this section, as they are the background for 
the empirical analysis in this ECRI report. As a qualification, we note that most of these papers 
were published before the onset of the financial crisis and therefore do not focus on the latest 
developments in the markets.  
5.1.1  Information sharing and credit market performance 
One of the earliest papers on the interaction of credit markets, competition and information 
sharing is Jappelli & Pagano (1993). The authors show how information sharing can arise 
endogenously in an adverse selection model, when banks are local monopolies and borrowers 
are mobile across (state) borders. Information sharing allows banks to adequately price the risk 
of immigrants. If there is severe adverse selection, data sharing leads to higher volumes of 
lending. The authors show that information sharing is more beneficial the higher the borrower 
mobility, as the lower are the costs of such exchanges and the greater the number of 
participants. 
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The effects of information sharing are also analysed in Padilla & Pagano (1997), who discuss a 
model in which entrepreneurs’ success depends on the level of invested effort. Banks can share 
information on the borrower’s type, which reduces their ability to lock-in borrowers, thereby 
increasing the latter’s incentives to exert effort or invest. The authors present different cases of 
information transmission in the market, one of which is the existence of a credit bureau. One of 
their main results is that information exchange triggers fiercer bank competition and reduces 
future interest rates and bank profits, thereby increasing efficiency by encouraging borrowers’ 
investment.
20 
If banks retain an initial advantage in soft information, information sharing can raise current 
profits. Furthermore, in Padilla & Pagano (2000), default information on borrowers can serve as 
a discipline device, which raises the incentive to perform.
21 In the regime without information 
sharing as well as one with full (positive–negative) information sharing, effort levels are 
inefficiently low. Effort levels can be adjusted when banks share only negative information. In 
our empirical section, we therefore account for different information-sharing regimes to test 
whether they have a differential impact on market contestability. 
One of the main reasons information sharing is beneficial is that in the absence of exclusivity in 
lending relationships it allows banks to keep track of borrowers that borrow from many 
different banks and are at risk of becoming over-indebted. This is at the core of Bennardo, 
Pagano & Piccolo (2009). Over-borrowing raises default risk, as contractual externalities arise. 
In the authors’ hidden action model, information sharing can compensate for a lack of creditor 
rights, as it allows creditors to monitor their borrowers and the credit market can reach full 
efficiency. 
5.1.2  Information sharing and bank competition 
The exchange of data on borrowers can have interesting effects, when viewed as an upstream 
activity that has an impact on downstream banks’ pricing strategies, and thus on competition 
and market contestability – an issue we explore by studying variables for market concentration 
and competition in our econometric estimations. Jappelli & Pagano (1993) already extended the 
analysis to the effects of competition. They showed that once market entry costs decline for 
foreign banks, making local markets contestable, the benefits from information sharing decline 
for the banks. Market entry costs shelter banks from competition and increase the benefits from 
information sharing that they are able to capture. In a paper closely related in focus to this 
report, Bouckaert, Degryse & Van Cayseele (1995) present a two-period overlapping 
generations model with banks, borrowers and different types of credit registers. The main 
interest is the evolving market structure in the equilibrium in the presence of either a positive or 
a negative register. Similar to Cournot competition, banks maximise profits by choosing the 
optimal number of outlets. In the case of a negative register, fewer banks enter the market and 
banks have more outlets (Bouckaert, Degryse & Van Cayseele 1995, p. 138). In the case of a 
positive register, more banks enter the market, but banks have fewer outlets – i.e. a higher 
number of smaller banks emerges.  
The intertwining of market structure in the banking industry and information asymmetries is 
also discussed by Dell’Ariccia (2001) and Hauswald & Marquez (2006), although without 
considering information sharing. Using a multi-period model of spatial competition, 
Dell’Ariccia (2001) shows that information asymmetries are an important determinant of market 
                                                      
20 In our empirical section, we present evidence that supports this assertion. 
21 This is also well discussed in Vercammen (1995), who shows that welfare arising from reputation 
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structure. In his set-up, adverse selection generates endogenously ‘fixed costs of entry’ and thus 
different degrees of adverse selection correspond to different degrees of market concentration.  
There is also an incentive for a bank to strategically disclose information on their borrowers to 
competitors to affect the rival’s entry into the segment of high-quality borrowers. In a duopoly 
and with two kinds of borrowers, banks can soften competition in the first period by disclosing 
information on their clients, who can now switch providers, but will incur switching costs in 
doing so. In Bouckaert & Degryse (2006), lenders strategically release information on a portion 
of the pool of borrowers. The unreleased pool becomes characterised by adverse selection, 
which can reduce the scale of entry by the rival. A related argument is developed in Gehrig & 
Stenbacka (2007). 
From this literature, we derive that information sharing can be used for different purposes, either 
strategic–competitive ones or those related to credit risk reduction. In the first case, banks try to 
influence the scale of entry and competition intensity, whereas in the second, the chief concern 
is to screen out bad risks. Whether such exchanges increase or decrease competition in the next 
rounds depends entirely on the model set-up, such that theory does not allow clear-cut 
conclusions to be drawn. This is an important point, as we intend to inform the theoretical 
discussion by adding some empirical evidence. 
5.1.3  Bank entry modes with different information regimes 
To date, there seem to be very few theoretical works relevant to the interaction of information 
sharing and the banks’ choice of entry mode. Two previously mentioned exceptions are 
Bouckaert, Degryse & Van Cayseele (1995) and Dell’Ariccia (2001), the latter using European 
markets as an anecdotal example. There are, however, closely related papers. In this section, we 
briefly discuss the most important papers in our context. 
Sengupta (2007), for example, models bank competition among asymmetrically informed 
principals facing a borrower’s unobservable risk, which is known only to the incumbent (from 
the previous relationship) and a borrower’s observable risk, which is common knowledge. The 
entrant’s success in gaining borrowers of lower risk depends on its ability to offer cheaper 
loans. This ability, in turn, increases with the entrant’s cost advantage. The author points out 
that better information ex ante (and stronger legal protections ex post) facilitates the entry of 
low-cost rivals. He also explains why foreign banks tend to serve larger firms, while domestic 
banks lend to riskier and more opaque market segments. The reason is that larger firms are more 
transparent, because they are subject to public reporting rules.  
Unfortunately, we could not obtain data on bank entry into specific market segments to account 
empirically for this assertion. Still, as is generally observable in Europe, wholesale lending 
occurs on a cross-border basis, whereas retail lending markets remain fragmented and cross-
border lending to households is in its infancy (European Commission, 2009; European Central 
Bank, 2009; Kleimeier & Sander, 2002). 
Related work on industrial organisation investigates the trade-off between greenfield and 
acquisition entry. Raff et al. (2009 and 2006) present models in which a firm’s decision between 
greenfield and acquisition depends on the differences in the marginal costs of foreign and 
domestic firms. In general, it is assumed that a greenfield entrant produces at lower marginal 
costs than domestic firms, because of superior production technology (Müller, 2007), and that 
when entering through an M&A the entrant loses this cost advantage because it is constrained 
by use of the inferior production technology of the acquired firm. At the same time, it is 
assumed that there are huge, fixed market-entry costs in entering through greenfield 
investments. 
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Claeys & Hainz (2007) examine the impact of different entry modes on interest rates. They state 
that while governments pledge to liberalise their markets, they often restrict entry modes, for 
example, by preventing foreign banks from taking major stakes in domestic banks. One of their 
main assumptions is that while incumbent banks have better information on their previous 
clients, foreign banks have better screening technologies. They distinguish two forms of entry: 
greenfield investment versus acquisition.  
While these authors are interested in how entry modes affect information distribution among 
foreigners and local banks, we turn this question around and ask how the extent and kind of 
existing data exchanges affect bank entry modes.
22 
With an emphasis on emerging economies, Van Tassel & Vishwasrao (2007) develop a model 
to study the trade-off between greenfield investments and acquisitions, offering an explanation 
for how equilibrium acquisition price and mode of entry are linked to ex post competition in the 
credit market. They suggest that a low-cost foreign bank and an informed domestic bank have 
incentives to trade information endowments, where foreign banks pursue acquisition strategies 
over de novo entry in order to capture valuable information held by domestic banks. This is also 
one of our key assumptions. With reference to the above, it can be argued that the informational 
advantage of entry through either acquisition or greenfield investment hinges on potential 
customers being non-transparent.  
Acquisition ought to be the dominant mode of entry in countries with insufficient information-
providing institutions and a relatively large number of non-transparent potential borrowers. To 
the knowledge of the authors, there are no theoretical works specifically addressing the choice 
of entry mode in terms of branching and M&As under different information-sharing regimes. At 
this stage, we leave this for further research and turn to the empirical evidence that provides the 
background to this paper. In the next section, we concentrate on evidence of the empirical 
interaction of information sharing and credit market performance, and then describe our novel 
dataset in comparison with pre-existing ones used in the studies surveyed below. 
5.2 Empirical  evidence 
An increasing number of authors empirically study the subject of information sharing and credit 
market performance. Many of them have shown that sharing information about a borrower’s 
type and history is beneficial for the performance of credit markets. These studies concentrate 
on the cross-country or firm level. 
5.2.1  The impact on credit market performance 
Although the empirical analysis of information sharing and credit market performance is 
expanding, there is a limited number of such works. Some empirical evidence on the positive 
effects of information sharing is presented in some of the papers quoted in the theoretical 
section (e.g. Bouckaert, Degryse & Van Cayseele, 1995; Jappelli & Pagano, 1993), where the 
empirical results in general confirm the theoretical conclusions.  
But there are additional empirical analyses that are of direct interest in our context. For instance, 
Djankov et al. (2007) explore with cross-sectional regressions and a sample of 129 countries the 
                                                      
22 Claeys & Hainz (2007) observe that foreign banks only enter markets if they are better organised in 
generating information on borrowers to undercut the domestic bank’s lending rate. We state that 
screening technologies are only imperfectly exportable, and therefore M&A modes would be preferred if 
no adequate information exchange exists. They further state that competition is stronger when a foreign 
bank enters through a greenfield investment than by acquiring an existing bank. We include this 
observation in a modified form, by analysing whether information-sharing mechanisms affect market 
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potential substitutability of credit registers and the protection of creditor rights in legal 
proceedings. Their results suggest that both the presence of credit registries and better creditor 
rights are associated with a higher ratio of private credit to GDP. Both private and public credit 
registries are positively associated with private credit in poorer countries, indicating a role for 
government in facilitating information sharing. 
Bofondi & Gobbi (2006) discuss the interaction of informational barriers and market entry for 
95 local Italian markets, which underlines the significance of information asymmetries between 
incumbents and entrants. For instance, these barriers contribute significantly to the entrants’ 
higher share of defaulting loans. The default rate is lower for banks that enter with local 
branches in these markets (compared with players that lend from a position outside the local 
market). As a proxy for the ‘knowledge of local markets’, the authors take a bank’s initial share 
of the local loan market. Since most of the banks are connected to a credit reporting system 
(which levels exogenous information asymmetries), this ought to reduce entry barriers – a fact 
we account for in this report.  
Related literature, which is not discussed here in greater detail, also associates credit reporting 
with access to finance (the interested reader is referred to Galindo & Miller, 2001, and to Love 
& Mylenko, 2003). 
5.2.2  Foreign bank participation and the choice to go abroad 
Only a few studies analyse empirically the choice of banks to go abroad either by opening a 
branch or a subsidiary.
23 In general, these emphasise the role of corporate taxes, lower 
regulatory restrictions and the inefficiencies of the local banks. We have integrated some of the 
most important determinants (which are used by most authors) as controls in our multivariate 
regressions. Some papers have highlighted banks’ decision to go abroad as being affected by 
advantages in processing information, owing to greater use of technology and specialised skills 
among other factors. For example, Claessens & van Hoeren (2008) (using bilateral data on bank 
ownership for 1995–2006) show that there is an institutional competitive advantage: for banks 
that are used to operating in environments with relatively high institutional quality, a high level 
of quality in the target market will positively impact on market entry compared with banks that 
do not operate in high-quality institutional environments.  
In other papers, informational costs play a role as determinants of M&As. These costs are often 
understood as differences in language and culture. Other drivers are regulations and taxation, 
bank-specific variables, saturated home markets, better profit opportunities abroad and other 
macroeconomic factors (Hryckiewicz & Kowalewski, 2008; Buch & Lipponer, 2007; Berger et 
al., 2004; Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2001).  
Hyrckiewicz & Kowalewski (2008) study the determinants of entry in four local markets in 
Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) for the period 1994–2004. 
The main drivers are the distance between the host country and the foreign bank headquarters, 
the growth rate differentials between the home and host markets, and the origin of commercial 
laws in the home country, among others. Buch & Lipponer (2004), on the other hand, analyse 
the international activities of German banks. They are especially interested in the decision of 
whether banks conduct FDI versus exports of financial services. They focus on the period 1997–
2000. They find that scale variables (at bank and country levels) are important as well as the 
provision of trade-related finance. Potential limits are cultural and geographical distance. 
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The effects of foreign bank participation in a host country’s banking system is not well 
documented empirically, but there is some evidence of the positive effects of foreign bank 
participation in developing countries (Giannetti & Ongena, 2005; Martinez Peria & Mody, 
2004). In particular, there are indications that on average, M&As are surpassed in terms of 
efficiency and cost of credit by greenfield banks.
24 Degryse et al. (2008) analyse the effects of 
foreign bank ownership on interest rates for transparent and opaque borrowers. They show that 
bank ownership and mode of entry have a large influence on banks’ portfolio composition in 
terms of borrowers. Yet, after controlling for these differences, there is no impact of foreign 
bank ownership or mode of entry on lending rates. 
Altogether, some stylised facts stand out from the above discussion (see also Buch & DeLong, 
2008). At the bank level, the probability of becoming an acquirer in an international merger is 
positively linked to the size band of profitability of an institution. At the country level, mergers 
of banks are more common among large and developed economies with a similar background, 
whereas regulatory barriers can deter entry. Another important aspect that has not been formally 
analysed to the knowledge of the authors is political protectionism, whereby some EU 
governments (e.g. Italy and Poland) have intervened to avert international takeovers of national 
banks (for a discussion, see Carletti & Vives, 2008). Despite the expanding literature, the 
empirical impact of credit reporting systems on the modes of bank entry into foreign markets 
has not been studied so far (to the knowledge of the authors), nor have informational costs been 
investigated as a potential determinant of the expansion strategy of a bank.
25 
6.  Exposition of the dataset 
Empirical research on information sharing and banking competition has not kept pace with 
theoretical developments. That being stated, there is now a noticeable trend towards greater 
sophistication in terms of the datasets and econometric techniques used. In the past, it has been 
standard to work with country-level information. Examples are Focarelli & Pozzolo (2001), 
Jappelli & Pagano (1993, 2002) and Bouckaert, Degryse & Van Cayseele (1995). Many of these 
studies use information from the World Bank’s Survey on Credit Registers, which has been 
conducted since 1999 and is now partially integrated in the Doing Business Database.  
Owing to the limited number of years for which data were available, most of the papers used 
country-level cross-sectional regressions rather than time series. In cross-sectional regressions, 
the determination of causality is a challenge, e.g. the difficulty is to disentangle the effect of 
whether more information sharing leads to more lending or if it is the other way round.  
One of our key contributions has been building a cross-sectional time series dataset on credit 
registers, which also allows us to draw some (cautious) conclusions about causality through 
application of a difference-in-differences analysis. This approach enables the removal of most 
biases that could be the result of permanent differences among country groups.  
Firm-level evidence, on the other hand, is presented in a rising number of papers (examples are 
Brown, Jappelli & Pagano, 2009 or Luoto, McIntosh & Wydick, 2007). In Brown, Jappelli &  
 
                                                      
24 See also Degryse et al. (2008), Vo Thi & Vencappa (2008), Havrylchyk & Jurzyk (2006) and Majnoni 
et al. (2003). 
25 In the international finance literature, information costs refer to geographical distance as well as 
differences in language, culture or customer expectations. In this paper, we use the term informational 
costs to refer to the existence of a public and private credit register as well as the kinds of information 
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Pagano (2009), the authors investigate the impact of data sharing on credit market performance 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. They use cross-sectional estimates and panel 
estimates performed on 5,717 firms from 24 countries. Altogether, they find positive effects 
from information sharing: the cost of credit is lower for firms, especially for opaque firms. 
These effects are stronger in countries with weak legal institutions. Further examples from a 
firm-level data survey, which we do not explicitly discuss, have been gathered by Love & 
Mylenko (2003). Finally, Brown & Zehnder (2006) undertake an experimental study, in which 
borrowers can or cannot repeatedly transact with lenders. In the latter case, credit reporting has 
little impact on market performance, but on trading structure and distribution, where it leads to 
fewer bank relationships. 
The new dataset we have compiled merges data from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation, 
the ECB, the SDC Platinum database and ECRI. The dataset is unique as we have gathered 
information on the EU-27 member states over the period 1990–2007 and included (and this is 
the novelty) information on credit reporting systems. Table 1 presents the variables that have 
been included in the dataset (and then used in our econometric analysis), with descriptions and 
data sources. Our dataset also allows us to work with a higher number of observations, 
depending on the variable (230-480 observations). In the past, much of the research on credit 
reporting was conducted with cross-country data and a low number of observations, which 
severely limits econometric analysis.  
To assess how foreign banks enter new markets, we used data on foreign bank activity in each 
of the EU-27 banking markets. We took into account the number of branches of foreign banks, 
and M&As per year from 1990 to 2007. The data on branches is based upon ECRI compilations 
from national central banks and the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. More precisely, to find out 
the number of entries through branches for each country and year (a flow measure), and to make 
it comparable with the number of entries through M&As (a flow measure), we differentiated the 
number of branches (i.e. a stock measure) over two consecutive periods.  
In the case of a negative variation, we assume zero entry. We are aware that this way of 
proceeding might not give the exact numbers of entries through branches. Two reasons justify 
the choice, however. First, when using branch variation over consecutive years (i.e. net entry 
through branches) we know the direction of the potential bias, i.e. underestimating the total 
number of entries through branches per year due to branch exits. Second, if we had compared 
the total number of branches with the total number of foreign subsidiaries (another stock 
variable at our disposal containing information on M&As), we would have also mistakenly 
captured some entries through de novo investments.  
The credit reporting systems were captured on two dimensions: their existence in the form of 
public and private credit registers as well as their ‘quality’ in terms of the kinds of information 
they collect. The variable we used for the regressions indicate the presence of a private credit 
bureau in the period 1990–2007. It equals 1 if a private bureau is operating and 0 otherwise, 
such that we capture the introduction of a credit bureau.  
A private credit bureau is defined as a company that collects and distributes credit information 
on consumers or businesses (or both). We have more than 400 observations on this variable. 
Information on public credit registers were collected from the national central banks. In 
addition, we collected the number of large and known credit bureaus in the individual countries 
(we excluded small, niche credit bureaus).  20 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
Table 1. Variable, description and sources 
Variable Description  and  source 
Branches  This variable is the number of branches of foreign credit institutions in each 
EU-27 member state for the period 1990–2007. A branch is an 
unincorporated entity that is established by a company legally incorporated 
in another country. It has no independent legal status and is wholly owned 
by its parent company. Branches of foreign credit institutions may offer 
some or all of the services of the parent institution. All branch offices set up 
in one country by the same institution constitute a single branch.  
Source: Authors’ compilation from national authorities and the ECB Statistical Data 
Warehouse. 
M&As  This variable counts the number of M&As per year for the period 1990–
2007. Domestic and cross-border M&As are separately taken into account.  
Source: SDC Platinum database. 
Private credit bureaus 
(Second) 
This indicates the presence of a private credit bureau in the period 1990–
2007. It equals 1 if a private bureau is operating and 0 otherwise. A private 
credit bureau is defined as a company that collects and distributes credit 
information on consumers or businesses (or both). The variable ‘second’ 
accounts for the second large credit bureau to be introduced in the market.  
Source: ECRI. 
Public credit register  This variable is the presence of a public credit register in the period 1990–
2007. It equals 1 if a public register is operating and 0 otherwise. Public 
registers are mostly established within a country’s central bank or 
supervisory authority, and in most cases, they store credit information on 
consumers and companies.  
Source: ECRI. 
Negative information 
(Negative_Priv 
and Negative_Pub) 
 
According to the EGCH, negative data generally consists of statements about 
defaults or arrears and bankruptcies (i.e. facts of contractual non-compliant 
behaviour). It may also include lawsuits, liens and judgments obtained from 
courts or other sources. Negative_Pub (Negative_Priv) is 2 if a private credit 
bureau (a public register) reports negative data for both consumers and 
firms, 1 if the register reports negative data for either consumers or firms, 
and 0 if it does not provide negative information. The time series covers the 
period 1990–2007.  
Source: ECRI. 
Positive information 
(Positive_Priv and 
Positive_Pub) 
 
According to the EGCH, positive information generally consists of assets 
and liabilities as well as guarantees. It sometimes includes outstanding types 
of credit, the amounts of loans and repayment patterns. Positive_Priv 
(Positive_Pub) is 2 if a private credit bureau (a public register) reports 
positive data on both consumers and firms, 1 if it reports positive data on 
either consumers or firms, and 0 if they do not provide positive information. 
The time series covers 1990–2007.  
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Table 1. cont’d. 
Number credit bureaus 
(No_Private_Bureau) 
This entails the number of the dominant (largest) private-credit bureaus in 
each country. The time series covers 1990–2007.  
Source: ECRI. 
Concentration ratio 3 
largest banks (CR3)  
Concentration is the ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total banking 
sector assets. The time series covers 1990–2007.  
Source: World Bank (A New Database on Financial Development and Structure). 
Gross domestic product 
per capita (p_gdp)  
This variable is country per capita GDP measured at current prices. The time 
series covers 1990–2007.  
Source: IMF. 
Return on assets (ROA)  ROA represents bank net income over total assets. For most countries, this 
information spans the period 1990–2007.  
Source: World Bank. 
Return on equity (ROE)  ROE is bank net income over equity. For most of the countries in the 
sample, this information covers the period 1990–2007.  
Source: World Bank. 
Net interest margin 
(NIM) 
NIM is the difference between bank interest income and the amount of 
interest paid out to deposits relative to total assets. For most of the countries 
in the sample, this information covers 1990–2007.  
Source: World Bank. 
Population   This variable refers to country population. The time series covers 1990–
2007.  
Source: IMF. 
Inflation  This variable represents average consumer prices (annual percentage 
change). The time series covers 1990–2007.  
Source: IMF. 
Legal origin   Legal origin is a dummy variable that indicates the origin of each country’s 
company law or commercial code, which may be of English, French, 
German, Nordic or Socialist origin. The time series covers 1990–2007.  
Source: Djankov et al. (2007) and the CIA World Factbook (2008). 
Credit_Bank   This variable is the amount of domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector over GDP. The time series covers 1990–2007.  
Source: World Bank. 
Overall freedom   Overall freedom is a simple average of 10 scored economic freedoms: 
business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary 
freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom 
from corruption and labour freedom. The time series covers 1995–2007.  
Source: Heritage Foundation.  22 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
The information quality (of positive or negative information) is of great importance when 
analysing banking competition and credit reporting. We applied the definitions used by the 
Expert Group on Credit Histories for these two kinds of information. Overall, this variable does 
not vary a lot, as there are not many countries that have changed their systems of reporting 
information. We collected information on both the reporting of positive information (on 
companies and individuals) and the reporting of negative information (on companies and 
individuals). To capture intervening variables that could be of consequence, we collected 
information on GDP, inflation and population (from the IMF) as well as legal origin, overall 
economic freedom and concentration of the largest banks from the standard sources (Table 2). 
We have undertaken various analyses relying on different measures and estimators to check the 
robustness of our indicators. Information on M&As is taken from the SDC Platinum database. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the dataset 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
branches_target 1.202 2.087 391
merger_target_cross 2.593 3.539 486
PRIVATE_BUREAU 0.877 0.329 486
PUBLIC_REGISTER 0.383 0.487 486
SECOND 0.788 0.409 486
positive_priv 1.206 0.723 486
negative_priv 1.492 0.706 486
positive_pub 0.644 0.877 486
negative_pub 0.504 0.824 486
no_PRIVATE_BUREAU 3.167 2.062 486
p_gdp 19.893 10.688 474
inflation 0.144 0.646 469
population 18.196 22.172 474
English 0.148 0.356 486
French 0.37 0.483 486
German 0.37 0.483 486
Scandinavian 0.111 0.32 486
 
Source: For data description and sources, see Table 1. 
 
7. Econometric  analysis 
In this section, we study the effects of the characteristics of credit reporting systems on bank 
entry mode, concentration and competition indicators for the banking sector. We perform both 
univariate and multivariate analyses looking at several different indicators of concentration and 
competition before and after the introduction of a credit register. We also take into account the 
potential role of diverse kinds of information shared among credit bureaus (i.e. positive or 
negative on consumers or firms). Finally, we check the robustness of our results by performing 
various regressions, paying attention to the nature of our dataset (i.e. time-series cross-section 
dataset). 
Difference-in-differences analysis is an econometric technique that measures the effect of a 
‘treatment’ or change (e.g. an event such as the establishment of a credit bureau) at a given 
period in time. For analysing the effect, the countries are separated in a treatment group and a 
control group (where the event has not taken place). The effects can be measured by a before–
after comparison of the means in the treatment group and by subtracting the mean of the control INFORMATION-SHARING AND CROSS-BORDER BANK ENTRIES | 23 
 
group. Groups can also be established along some other characteristics, such as a high or low 
concentration of a banking industry in a country.  
The strength of this technique is that it is not a simple before–after comparison. By subtracting 
the mean of the control group, all other changes that took place at the same time in both 
groups
26 (and that are unrelated to the establishment of a credit register) are subtracted. This 
enables us to draw better conclusions about the causes of effects compared with simple cross-
country regressions. 
7.1 Univariate  analysis 
7.1.1  Impact of credit reporting: Methodology 
Relying on univariate difference-in-differences analysis, some preliminary insights on the 
impact of credit reporting on bank entry mode, market structure and competition can be 
obtained. We focus on variations in the share of entries through branches and various indicators 
of market concentration and competition. To measure the share of entries into foreign markets 
through branches, we compute the share of branches in the following way: 
) & /( _ Entry As M Tot Entry Branch Tot Entry Branch Tot ratio Entry + =      (1) 
In equation (1), the total number of cross-border entries in the parentheses consists of the total 
number of cross-border mergers and cross-border entries through branches. To measure 
variations in the market structure before and after the introduction of a credit register, we rely 
on the sum of market shares of the three largest banks (CR3) as an indicator of market 
concentration. As indices of market structure do not always capture the degree of competition in 
banking markets (see Claessens & Laeven, 2004), we use as proxy indicators of competition 
bank net interest margin (NIM), return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), and bank 
overhead costs over total assets.  
To perform a difference-in-differences analysis, two groups of countries have to be identified: a 
treatment and a control group. Similar to Djankov et al. (2007), our treatment group comprises 
countries that introduced either a private credit bureau or a public register in the period of the 
analysis, i.e. from 1990 to 2007. To guarantee sufficient variation in the data in this univariate 
analysis of private bureaus, we use as a reference date the year of the introduction of the second 
private bureau in each country. Indeed, for many countries the first private bureau was 
introduced before 1990 or in the years just after. Moreover, for private bureaus, we believe that 
the introduction of a second register may represent an important variation in the competitive 
structure of the credit reporting system. This exercise therefore captures the effect of an increase 
in competition in the information-sharing industry besides that of an increase in the degree of 
information sharing (new private registers typically cover additional segments of borrowers). 
To study the effect of credit registers on the share of entries through branches, we further split 
the sample into low- and high-concentration country groups according to the value of the CR3 
(CR3>/<60%).
27 As a matter of definition, we assume that markets with a CR3 above 60% are 
concentrated. We then compare the difference before and after the introduction of a credit 
register for the two groups of countries using the high-concentration group of countries as a 
‘control group’. By doing so, we remove biases that could be the result of permanent differences 
between countries that are related to the level of concentration. In line with the ECJ’s analysis, 
                                                      
26 The technique assumes that both groups are homogenous. 
27 The results are substantially analogous using a threshold of 50%. 24 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
we would expect a positive difference-of-the-differences, that is, fewer entries through branches 
after the introduction of a credit register in more highly concentrated markets.
 28 
Assume that ΔEntry_ratio(i)=Entry_ratio(i,after)-Entry_ratio(i,before) is the change in the 
average of the Entry_ratio in country i  after the introduction of a credit register, and let 
) _ ( _ conc low ratio Entry Δ   be the average of the change in the entry ratio in the low-
concentration group of countries. The same can be computed for the high-concentration group 
as well. The average effect of an information-sharing institution is equal to the difference of the 
change in the mean of the two country groups, i.e. 
) _ ( _ ) _ ( _ conc high ratio Entry conc low ratio Entry Effect Average Δ − Δ =     (2) 
In equation (2), the average difference over time in the high-concentration group is subtracted 
from the average difference in the low-concentration group to remove biases associated with 
systematic differences in concentration between the two groups. To investigate the effects of the 
introduction of a credit register on the concentration index CR3, the control group consists of 
countries that did not introduce a public register in a five-year window around the year of the 
reform in the treated country. For instance, Bulgaria introduced a public register in 1998. The 
control group comprises all the countries that did not introduce a public register from 1993 to 
2003.
29  
For a country introducing a private bureau, we follow the same procedure. We choose this 
specification because if the control group comprises countries that never introduced a credit 
register in the same time window, the sample is considerably reduced. Owing to low cross-
country variability, for the private credit bureau variable this would imply a control group of 
inferior quality. Furthermore, the five-year time window allows comparability with the results 
of Djankov et al. (2007). Still, we check the results for different control-group and time-window 
specifications, and find that the results do not change substantially.  
More precisely, let ΔCR3(i)=CR3(i,after)-CR3(i,before) be the change in the average share of 
the three main banks in country i in a five-year window around the year of the reform in the 
treated country, and let ΔCR3(treated) be the average of the change in CR3 in the treated 
country group. The same can be computed for the control group. Obviously, ΔCR3(control,i) 
can be computed for each country that introduced a register. Similarly, let ΔCR3(control) be the 
average change in CR3 in the overall group of countries that did not introduce a register during 
the five-year window around t. In this case, the average effect of an information-sharing 
institution is equal to  
  ) ( 3 ) ( 3 control CR treated CR Effect Average Δ − Δ =      (3) 
In equation (3), the average difference over time in the control group is subtracted from the 
average difference in the treatment group to remove biases associated with a common trend 
unrelated to the introduction of a register as well as bias associated with systematic differences 
that are constant within the two groups. 
                                                      
28 As mentioned earlier, in its analysis of the potential anti-competitive effects of data sharing, the ECJ 
noted that information exchange should be pro-competitive if relevant markets are not highly 
concentrated.  
29 These are Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta and Poland (when using all the new EU member states). 
When all member states are used, the group consists of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
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7.1.2  Results of the univariate analysis 
The results from the univariate difference-in-differences analysis are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the introduction of a credit register has an impact on bank cross-border entry 
mode. Table 3 reports the average effects on branch share, separately for public and private 
registers, where countries have been grouped according to high and low levels of concentration. 
After the introduction of a public credit register, we can observe a variation in the share of 
entries through branches that is statistically significant: the share of entries through branches 
increases significantly after the introduction of a public credit register in countries with a low 
level of market concentration. Also, the difference between high- and low-concentration 
countries is positive and significant (+24% significant at the 1% level). To see whether there are 
any differences related to accession to the EU, we additionally present results for the new EU 
member states alone. 
A similar pattern can be observed for the introduction of a private credit bureau (see also Table 
3). In this case, we can observe a positive effect on entry through branches (+20% significant at 
the 10% level) where the sample comprises all countries. There is an even greater positive effect 
when it comprises only new member states (+50% significant at the 5% level). In line with the 
ECJ’s analysis, these results tentatively suggest that we can observe a higher rate of entry 
through branches after a credit register is introduced in countries with a low level of 
concentration. 
Table 3. Effects on branching after the introduction of a credit register  
% Branches  ∆% Branches
After-Before
All countries N N
Low concentration 49 0.18 42 0.30 0.12**
High concentration 130 0.46 82 0.34 -0.12**
Difference -0.28*** -0.04 0.24***
New Members N N
Low concentration 16 0.14 20 0.29 0.15*
High concentration 61 0.44 38 0.29 -0.15*
Difference -0.30*** 0.00 0.30***
After-Before
All countries N N
Low concentration 16 0.16 75 0.25 0.09
High concentration 28 0.51 184 0.40 -0.11
Difference -0.35*** -0.15*** 0.20*
New members N N
Low concentration 15 0.10 40 0.29 0.19***
High concentration 2 0.75 111 0.44 -0.31
Difference -0.65*** -0.15*** 0.50**
Private bureau
Before After
Public register
 
Notes: This table reports the average effects (difference-of-the-differences) of the introduction of a credit register on 
the share of entries through branches (∆% branches). Countries have been grouped according to high (>60%) and 
low levels of concentration (<60%), so that the average difference in the high-concentration group (after–before) is 
subtracted from the average difference in the low-concentration group (after–before). For data descriptions, see 
Table 1. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
These results do not arise because we observed more mergers in more highly concentrated 
markets or because of the way we compute our indicators. Indeed, by looking separately at 
entries through branches and mergers as shown in Table 4, we can also observe an absolute 
number of mergers that is higher in less concentrated markets compared with highly 26 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
concentrated markets. (The reverse is also true for branches – see for example the top left-hand 
cell for all the countries with the presence of a private bureau.) 
Table 4. Branches and mergers after the introduction of a credit register 
Concentration Branches Mergers Branches Mergers
All countries
Low concentration 0.59* 2.34** 1.27*** 1.11*
High concentration 0.71** 1.93*** 0.26 1.40***
Difference -0.11 0.41 1.01*** -0.29
New members
Low concentration -0.98 4.07 1.04** -0.91
High concentration 0.23 1.47 -0.05 1.19
Difference -1.21 2.60*** 1.09** 2.10*
Private bureau Public register
 
Notes: Table 4 reports the average effects (difference-of-the-differences) of the introduction of a credit register, 
separately for branches and mergers. Countries have been grouped according to high (>60%) and low levels of 
concentration (<60%). The average effects are obtained by subtracting the average difference in the high-
concentration group from the average difference in the low-concentration group. For data descriptions, see Table 1. 
Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
The important role of a public register is confirmed in Table 5, where we analyse the variation 
in the concentration index CR3. To check robustness, we additionally allowed only new EU 
member states as a control group. After the introduction of a public register, a significant 
reduction in the share of the three largest banks is observable. The average effect is -12% 
(significant at the 1% level), when the control group consists of the EU-27. It is -10% 
(significant at the 1% level) when using only new member states in the control group. For a 
private credit bureau, the direction of the effect is analogous (although not significant).  
Table 5. CR3 after the introduction of a public register and a private bureau 
CR3 ∆CR3
After-Before
NN
Treated 36 0.76 34 0.65 -0.11***
Control EU 27 341 0.69 282 0.70 0.01
Difference 0.07*** -0.05 -0.12***
Control New EU 150 0.71 100 0.70 -0.01
Difference 0.05** -0.05 -0.10***
After-Before
NN
Treated 31 0.77 57 0.74 -0.03
Control EU 27 285 0.69 288 0.71 0.02*
Difference 0.08** 0.03*** -0.05
Control New EU 140 0.68 104 0.69 0.01
Difference 0.09** 0.05** -0.04
Public Register
Before After
Private Bureau
 
Notes: This table reports the average effects (difference-of-the-differences) of the introduction of a credit register on 
the concentration index (∆CR3). Countries have been grouped according to the date of the introduction of the credit 
register. In the treated group, there are countries that introduced a credit register in the period 1990–2007, whereas in 
the control group there are countries that did not introduce a credit register in a five-year window around the year t, 
in which the treated country introduced the credit register. Each treated country has its control group. The average 
effect is obtained by subtracting the average difference of the control group from the average difference in the 
treatment group. To deal with any differences among countries related to accession to the EU, a second control group 
was constructed that only uses new member states. For data descriptions, see Table 1. Asterisks denote significance 
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. INFORMATION-SHARING AND CROSS-BORDER BANK ENTRIES | 27 
 
The results for competition indicators such as ROA or ROE (see Tables 6 and 7) are largely 
consistent with the hypothesis of an intensification of competition after the introduction of a 
credit register. The measures for profitability are expected to decline (ROA and ROE) as well as 
the NIM.  
Table 6. Other competition indicators before–after the introduction of a private bureau 
Indicator Concentration EU 27 New Eu
Net Int Margin Low conc 0.014** -0.068**
High conc -0.018*** -0.006
Diff of diff 0.032*** -0.06***
Roe Low conc -0.027* 0.02
High conc -0.059*** -0.05*
Diff of diff 0.031 0.07
Roa Low conc 0.01** 0.079
High conc -0.008*** -0.010***
Diff of diff 0.019*** 0.089***
Overhead costs/Assets Low conc 0.013** -0.067**
High conc 0.002 0.015***
Diff of diff 0.011* -0.082***
Costs/Income Low conc 0.115*** 0.029
High conc 0.136 0.201***
Diff of diff -0.021 -0.173***
∆Indicator
 
Notes: This table reports the average effects (difference-of-the-differences) of the introduction of a private bureau on 
the NIM, ROE, ROA, overhead costs over total assets and costs over income. Countries have been grouped 
according to high (>60%) and low levels of concentration (<60%). The average effect is obtained by 
subtracting the average difference in the high-concentration group from the average difference in the low-
concentration group. For data descriptions, see Table 1. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10,   
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
 
Although the impact of a private credit bureau on the market structure may not seem strong, 
competition appears intensified, especially in highly concentrated markets. For example, after 
the introduction of a private bureau, there are indications of significant reductions in NIMs (-
1.8%), ROE (-5.9%) and ROA (-0.08%), although again, these are most notable in highly 
concentrated markets. 
Competition indicators are also of interest in Table 7. In general, these descriptive results 
suggest that both types of credit registers may have an impact – not only on the modes of bank 
entry, but also on the market structure and level of competition.  
For a more sophisticated analysis, we have to control for a set of variables and take care of 
econometric problems, such as country heterogeneity. In the next section, we present some more 
refined econometric estimations. 
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Table 7. Other competition indicators before–after the introduction of a public register 
Indicator Concentration EU 27 New Eu
Net Int Margin Low conc 0.003 -0.018***
High conc -0.007*** -0.010***
Diff of diff 0.010*** -0.008
Roe Low conc -0.0199* -0.006
High conc -0.034** -0.023
Diff of diff 0.014 0.017
Roa Low conc 0.001 0.005
High conc -0.004*** -0.006**
Diff of diff -0.021 -0.001
Overhead costs/Assets Low conc 0.0016 -0.019***
High conc 0.0017 0.005
Diff of diff -0.0001 -0.024***
Costs/Income Low conc 0.105*** -0.063
High conc 0.102*** 0.122
Diff of diff 0.003 -0.185***
∆Indicator
 
Notes: This table reports the average effects (difference-of-the-differences) of the introduction of a public register on 
the NIM, ROE, ROA, overhead costs over total assets and costs over income. Countries have been grouped 
according to high (>60%) and low levels of concentration (<60%). The average effect is obtained by subtracting the 
average difference in the high-concentration group from the average difference in the low-concentration group. For 
data descriptions, see Table 1. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
 
7.2 Multivariate  analysis 
We now turn to the investigation of the effects of credit reporting systems on bank entry mode, 
market structure and competition in a richer econometric framework. A multivariate regression 
approach allows us to control for the effects of many other independent variables that could also 
affect the dependent variable. These variables comprise traditional controls, such as legal origin 
or inflation, as well as specific indicators that we have constructed on the kinds of information 
shared by a credit register.  
We study the effects of different features of credit reporting systems on the total number of 
entries through branches, and separately on mergers, in each country and year, as well as on the 
share of branches among total entries. Next, we present the impact of credit reporting systems 
on bank competition (to measure bank competition, we use the NIM variable). To study the 
number of entries through branches and mergers, and to account for the two country groups 
(new member states and the EU-15), we rely on a random coefficient Poisson model.
30 This 
approach allows us to address the dependence within groups of countries, while taking into 
account that the dependent variable of the model is a non-negative integer. In addition, it allows 
us to assume a differential impact of the two types of credit registers in the two country groups. 
More precisely, the model is obtained by specifying the expected number of branches or 
mergers ) ( ij μ  in country i in group j (with j=EU-15, new EU) with a private/public register 
random slope ( j ξ ), that is 
                                                      
30 The Poisson model is a standard model in econometrics. It is used to model count data and assumes that 
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where 
ij BUREAU PRIVATE_  in (4) is equal to 1 in the years after the introduction of a private 
credit bureau (in country i of group j) and 
ij REGISTER PUBLIC_  is equal to 1 in the years after 
the introduction of a public register and 
ij X  is a vector of other variables reflecting the 
characteristics of a country’s credit reporting system. Specifically, 
ij X  contains a dummy 
variable equal to 1 in the years after the introduction of the second private bureau (denoted as 
SECOND), the number of private credit bureaus (no_private_bureau), and four indicators 
summarising different aspects of information sharing: POSITIVE_PRIV,  NEGATIVE_PRIV, 
POSITIVE_PUB, NEGATIVE_PUB.  
The variable SECOND maps the introduction of a second large, private-credit bureau. This 
variable is introduced to be in line with the univariate difference-in-differences analysis where 
we use it to account for the problem that insufficient variability exists for this analysis, if using 
the date of the introduction of the first register. POSITIVE_PRIV and POSITIVE_PUB are equal 
to 2 if a private credit bureau (Priv) or a public register (Pub) reports positive information for 
both consumers and firms, to 1 if it reports positive information for either consumers or firms 
and to 0 if it does not provide positive information. Similarly, NEGATIVE_PRIV and 
NEGATIVE_PUB are equal to 2 if a private credit bureau or a public register reports negative 
information for both consumers and firms, to 1 if the register reports negative information for 
either consumers or firms and to 0 if the register does not provide negative information. Table 8 
reports correlations among the variables. A correlation coefficient is a number that can vary 
between -1 and 1, which measures the degree to which two variables are linearly related. This 
coefficient is 1 if there is a perfect linear relationship with a positive slope between the two 
variables. Except for Positive_Pub (which contains almost the same variability as the 
Public_Register dummy), these variables seem to provide diverse information on the structure 
of credit reporting systems. 
Table 8. Correlation coefficients 
PRIVATE 
BUREAU
PUBLIC 
REGISTER
SECOND positive priv negative priv positive pub negative pub
no PRIVATE 
BUREAU
PRIVATE BUREAU 1
PUBLIC REGISTER .29550625 1
SECOND .72368838 .40833356 1
positive priv .62665217 .39705262 .65674522 1
negative priv .79425825 .23741512 .69751489 .69054779 1
positive pub .27573988 .93311014 .38102018 .45053829 .25668087 1
negative pub .22977167 .77755267 .31750085 .2581224 .09755316 .70477372 1
no PRIVATE BUREAU .57703166 .34120662 .68245187 .80428468 .66214212 .37364914 .15915106 1  
Sources: For data descriptions and sources, see Table 1. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 report the results for a random Poisson model for the total number of entries 
through branches and mergers in each country. Coefficients can be interpreted as the log of the 
ratio of the expected counts (irr).
31 Therefore, in the Poisson model, a coefficient greater than 1 
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suggests a positive effect (for example, 1.22 means +22%), whereas a coefficient less than 1 
suggests a negative effect (for example, 0.60 means –40%).  
The best way to interpret these estimations is to form intervals within which 95% of the slopes 
are expected to lie (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). For instance, the coefficient on 
PRIVATE_BUREAU for sharing negative information on consumers and firms is equal to 
0.29±1.96·0.16+1.43, where 0.16 is sd(PRIVATE_BUREAU).
32 That is, the effect of the 
introduction of a private bureau is expected to lie between 1.41 and 1.74, meaning 41% and 
74% in terms of branches. The overall impact of a public register is also positive and significant 
(see Table 9).
33  
For mergers, on the other hand, the effect of a public register sharing positive information is 
negative and significant at the 5% level, whereas a similar negative impact comes from the 
introduction of a private bureau sharing negative information. A coefficient greater than 1 for 
the variable on the number of major private bureaus also suggests that the greater the number of 
major private bureaus, the higher the number of cross-border bank mergers. 
The results are confirmed by adding other country control variables, with the sole exception of 
the variable on number of major private bureaus in the random Poisson model for mergers. 
Other controls are the country’s legal origin of commercial laws (German, French, English or 
Scandinavian) and a country’s per-capita GDP, inflation and population (column b in Table 9).  
A country’s legal origin is an important determinant of both creditor rights and private credit 
(Djankov et al., 2007; La Porta et al., 1997; Levine, 1999), whereas better macroeconomic 
conditions make larger commitments less risky (i.e. entry through branches).  
With the country’s population, we control for different market size. Most of the controls are 
significant, with the expected direction of the effect associated with them. Finally, to account 
for a country’s institutional environment, we add in column c of Table 9 the Index of Economic 
Freedom (by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal), which is the average of 10 
scored economic freedoms (such as fiscal freedom, financial and banking freedom and 
government size) and domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage ratio of 
GDP. Despite obtaining a smaller sample (the Index is available only from 1995 onwards), the 
results are practically unchanged. One would perhaps have expected a positive effect of the 
freedom variable, which we do not find.  
To study the effects of credit reporting systems on the share of branches, we estimate a random 
Tobit model, which takes into account that the dependent variable – the share of entries through 
branches – is a censored variable (that is partly continuous with a positive probability mass at 
zero). Table 11 presents the results for the Tobit model. The reported estimations are marginal 
effects computed at the mean level for continuous variables and for a discrete change for 
dummy variables. Table 11 also shows the marginal effects. Overall, these regressions seem to 
suggest a positive role of private credit bureaus in affecting the share of entries through 
branches (generally the effect of a credit bureau is positive and significant). These regressions, 
however, do not provide strong indications. In the next section, we deal with other data 
problems that may affect the results.  
                                                      
32 The term ‘sd’ refers to the standard deviation. 
33 These results are strongly confirmed when solely using observations for which the number of branches 
is greater than zero, in order to control for an excessive number of zeros compared with the Poisson 
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Table 9. Estimation results: Random coefficient Poisson (branches) 
abc
PRIVATE_BUREAU 0.2883*** 0.3311*** 0.1773***
(0.097) (0.137) (0.109)
PUBLIC_REGISTER 0.6373 0.7476 0.8018
(0.255) (0.368) (0.468)
SECOND 0.9289 1.0196 2.4538*
(0.249) (0.315) (1.130)
positive_priv 0.9546 1.0995 1.0818
(0.123) (0.161) (0.181)
negative_priv 1.4355** 1.5966** 2.1294***
(0.224) (0.298) (0.496)
positive_pub 1.2150 1.1526 1.188
(0.196) (0.193) (0.235)
negative_pub 1.3812*** 1.2723 1.0561
(0.139) (0.211) (0.193)
no_PRIVATE_BUREAU 1.2014*** 1.086 1.0688
(0.043) (0.076) (0.087)
p_gdp 1.0153** 1.0476***
(0.007) (0.012)
inflation 1.0529 1.0019
(0.090) (0.097)
population 1.0068* 1.0042
(0.004) (0.005)
English 0.3816*** 2.6946
(0.109) (2.518)
French 0.5135** 2.5944
(0.157) (2.157)
German 0.4769** 2.0028
(0.161) (1.774)
Scandinavian 0.8112 3.9955
(0.270) (3.398)
CREDIT_BANK 1.0021
(0.002)
OVERALL_FREEDOM 0.9544***
(0.014)
sd(PRIVATE_BUREAU) 0.1574** 0.0887 0.3253
(0.116) (0.141) (0.243)
sd(PUBLIC_REGISTER) 0.3011* 0.4182 0.5269
(0.192) (0.256) (0.327)
cov(PUBLIC_REGISTER, PRIVATE_BUREAU) 1.00 0.0002 0.0001
0.001 (0.330) (0.085)
ll -671.1202 -585.1088 -456.9505
N 391 383 308
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of branches in each country and year. The random Poisson model is a 
mixed-effects model that takes into account that the dependent variable is a non-negative integer and there are two 
groups of countries (new member states and the EU-15). The coefficients can be interpreted as the log of the ratio of 
the expected counts (incidence-rate ratio). A coefficient greater than 1 suggests a positive effect (for example, 1.38 
means +38%), whereas a coefficient less than 1 suggests a negative effect (for example, 0.63 means –37%). For data 
descriptions, see Table 1. The term sd is the standard deviation, N is the number of observations, and a, b and c 
denote the different models that were estimated. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,   
*** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 32 | GIANNETTI, JENTZSCH & SPAGNOLO 
 
Table 10. Estimation results: Random coefficient Poisson (mergers) 
abc
PRIVATE_BUREAU 1.2217 1.171 0.9975
(0.239) (0.339) (0.349)
PUBLIC_REGISTER 0.7869 0.5386** 0.3517***
(0.233) (0.151) (0.098)
SECOND 1.2779 2.3276*** 2.2612***
(0.222) (0.511) (0.549)
positive_priv 1.1421 1.4451*** 1.2921**
(0.107) (0.142) (0.143)
negative_priv 0.6037*** 0.8757 0.7627**
(0.057) (0.092) (0.087)
positive_pub 0.7947** 0.9009 0.9971
(0.074) (0.097) (0.122)
negative_pub 1.6667*** 1.2172 1.3341***
(0.095) (0.149) (0.122)
no_PRIVATE_BUREAU 1.3443*** 0.8993*** 1.0093
(0.031) (0.036) (0.041)
p_gdp 1.0132** 1.0158***
(0.006) (0.006)
inflation 0.4361*** 0.8552
(0.115) (0.119)
population 1.0277*** 1.0222***
(0.002) (0.002)
English 0.4880*** 0.6281
(0.109) (0.350)
French 0.7326 0.9475
(0.180) (0.472)
German 0.6405 0.9351
(0.209) (0.472)
Scandinavian 0.3473*** 0.4162*
(0.091) (0.218)
CREDIT_BANK 0.9985
(0.001)
OVERALL_FREEDOM 1.0004
(0.008)
sd(PRIVATE_BUREAU) 0.0647*** 0.1394 0
(0.060) (0.172) (0.041)
sd(PUBLIC_REGISTER) 0.3226** 0.0983* 0
(0.175) (0.133) (0.065)
cov(PRIVATE_BUREAU, PUBLIC REGISTER) 1.00 -1 -0.0136
(0.001) (0.207) (0.001)
ll -1157.783 -1017.749 -746.5485
N 486 469 335
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of mergers in each country and year. The random Poisson model is a 
mixed-effects model that takes into account that the dependent variable is a non-negative integer and there are two 
groups of countries (new member states and the EU-15). The coefficients can be interpreted as the log of the ratio of 
the expected counts (incidence-rate ratio). A coefficient greater than 1 suggests a positive effect (for example, 1.22 
means +22%), whereas a coefficient less than 1 suggests a negative effect (for example, 0.60 means –40%). For data 
descriptions, see Table 1. The term sd is the standard deviation, N is the number of observations, and a, b and c 
denote the different models that were estimated. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,   
*** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. INFORMATION-SHARING AND CROSS-BORDER BANK ENTRIES | 33 
 
Table 11. Estimation results (dependent variable: % of branches) 
abc
PRIVATE_BUREAU -0.5585* -0.6989* -1.1516**
(0.315) (0.381) (0.494)
PUBLIC_REGISTER -0.4394 -0.0502 -0.0183
(0.442) (0.356) (0.408)
SECOND 0.0193 -0.0839 0.1362
(0.269) (0.258) (0.343)
positive_priv -0.0288 -0.1719 -0.1658
(0.176) (0.142) (0.166)
negative_priv 0.5260*** 0.3717** 0.5492***
(0.181) (0.175) (0.204)
positive_pub 0.1439 0.1290 0.1095
(0.206) (0.166) (0.183)
negative_pub 0.0957 0.0857 0.1139
(0.148) (0.133) (0.146)
no_PRIVATE_BUREAU -0.0395 0.0351 0.0224
(0.058) (0.066) (0.074)
p_gdp -0.0007 0.0173*
(0.006) (0.009)
inflation 0.0915 0.0568
(0.079) (0.082)
population -0.0055 -0.0057
(0.004) (0.004)
English 0.6697** 1.6235*
(0.280) (0.830)
French 0.2732 1.0573
(0.289) (0.746)
German 0.3332 1.2258
(0.268) (0.779)
Scandinavian 0.7867** 1.6610**
(0.332) (0.773)
CREDIT_BANK 0.0003
(0.002)
OVERALL_FREEDOM -0.0211
(0.013)
sigma_u 0.2549** 0.0000** 0.0000
(0.101) (0.000) (0.180)
sigma_e 0.8459*** 0.8223*** 0.8163***
(0.067) (0.064) (0.071)
ll -309.1181 -293.9053 -235.7769
N 307 304 250
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of entries through branches. The Tobit model takes into account that the 
dependent variable is a censored variable (i.e. partly continuous with a positive probability mass at zero). The 
reported estimations are marginal effects computed at the mean level for continuous variables, and for a discrete 
change for dummy variables. For data descriptions, see Table 1. N is the number of observations, and a, b and c 
denote the different models that were estimated. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,   
*** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
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We have also studied the effect of credit reporting systems on NIMs (Table 12). These results 
suggest that the introduction of a second credit bureau fosters competition in the banking sector, 
where net interest rates decline. The same is true for the establishment of public credit registers 
that share either negative or positive information. 
Table 12. Estimation results (dependent variable: NIM) 
abc
PRIVATE_BUREAU -0.0112 -0.0135 0.0031
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
PUBLIC_REGISTER 0.0283*** 0.0350*** 0.0399***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
SECOND -0.0263*** -0.0204*** 0.0021
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
positive_priv -0.0061 -0.0067 -0.0005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
negative_priv 0.0015 0.0035 -0.0067**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
positive_pub -0.0096** -0.0025 -0.0143***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
negative_pub -0.0262*** -0.0313*** -0.0226***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
no_PRIVATE_BUREAU -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
p_gdp 0.0008*** 0.0006***
(0.000) (0.000)
inflation 0.0092*** 0.0048***
(0.003) (0.001)
population 0.0005** 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000)
English 0.0003 0.0507***
(0.009) (0.014)
French 0.0334*** 0.0549***
(0.011) (0.014)
German 0.0710*** 0.0726***
(0.009) (0.016)
Scandinavian 0.0298*** 0.0544***
(0.008) (0.015)
CREDIT_BANK -0.0001**
(0.000)
OVERALL_FREEDOM -0.0005**
(0.000)
ll 1391.224 1422.031 1128.842
N 450 446 333
 
Notes: For data descriptions, see Table 1. N is the number of observations, and a, b and c denote the different models 
that were estimated. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
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7.3  Robustness checks for the multivariate analysis 
Testing hypotheses regarding the effects of credit registers on bank entry modes with the dataset 
presented involves the problems typically related to the use of time-series cross-section datasets 
(TSCS). TSCS consist of a sequence of time series observed for different units – as in a panel 
dataset – where the value of time observations, T, is rather high in relation to the number of 
units  N. In this respect, one usually distinguishes TSCS data from panels found in 
microeconomic applied analysis, which are characterised by a large N and small T as estimators 
for panel data and can induce problems when applied to TSCS data (Beck & Katz, 1995).  
There is no clear-cut rule. In general terms, a one-digit panel dataset for T is considered. 
Nevertheless, the notations are equal and the distinction between these two kinds of datasets 
appears relevant, since it allows us to neglect some issues that are associated with panel data 
analysis while creating new concerns that require attention. 
In particular, in this section we deal with two methodological problems: the heterogeneity of 
panel data, and cojoint inclusion of time-invariant variables and fixed effects.  
In addition, we have taken into account the concern related to the specification of the model 
while respecting that the share of branches is bounded by 0 and 1. Therefore, we perform our 
regression relying only on those observations that are greater than 0 or less than 1 in order to 
avoid a censoring problem.  
The inclusion of country-fixed effects precludes the inclusion of time-invariant or slowly 
changing variables as independent variables. Distinguishing between their influence and the 
influence of omitted country-specific variables might be difficult. If fixed effects are not 
included in the model, the time-invariant variables will carry the weight of all the country-
specific factors.  
To overcome this problem, Plümper & Troeger (2007) propose a procedure for analysing the 
effect of time-invariant variables in a model including fixed effects. Their procedure has three 
stages: 
•  estimate a fixed-effect model, 
•  regress the unit effects on the time-invariant variables, and 
•  re-estimate the first stage including the error term of the second stage (XTFEVD 
procedure). 
Their Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the fixed-effect vector decomposition (XTFEVD) 
estimator is the least biased estimator when time-variant and time-invariant variables are 
correlated with the unit effects. We adopt this procedure to account for the fact that 
POSITIVE_PRIV,  NEGATIVE_PRIV,  POSITIVE_PUB,  NEGATIVE_PUB and 
no_private_bureau are slowly changing variables. The results are reported below in   
Table 13.  
These results basically confirm our previous ones. More specifically, they allow stronger 
conclusions to be drawn about the role of a private credit bureau that also shares positive 
information, suggesting a positive effect on the share of cross-border bank entries through 
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Table 13. XTFEVD estimator (dependent variable: the logit ratio) 
abc
PRIVATE_BUREAU 0.4757*** 0.0172 0.0052
(0.129) (0.173) (0.261)
PUBLIC_REGISTER 0.0194 -0.0668 0
(0.137) (0.140) (0.174)
SECOND 0.0341 0.0127 (0.000)
(0.110) (0.112) (0.236)
positive_priv 0.0929* 0.2704*** 0.5332***
(0.049) (0.086) (0.141)
negative_priv -0.0156 0.1743* 0.1614
(0.062) (0.104) (0.103)
positive_pub 0.0188 -0.0376 -0.1576*
(0.070) (0.071) (0.091)
negative_pub -0.0797** -0.0882 -0.1366*
(0.039) (0.057) (0.069)
no_PRIVATE_BUREAU -0.0330** -0.1941*** -0.2817***
(0.016) (0.065) (0.078)
eta 0.7926*** 1.0000*** 1.0000***
(0.294) (0.331) (0.270)
p_gdp -0.0004 -0.0001
(0.003) (0.005)
inflation -0.0037 -0.0161
(0.021) (0.023)
population 0.0140** 0.0185***
(0.005) (0.006)
English 0.1585 1.6366***
(0.153) (0.422)
French 0.2602* 1.7841***
(0.145) (0.423)
German 0.4573*** 1.9204***
(0.124) (0.447)
Scandinavian 0.3190** 1.8697***
(0.153) (0.430)
CREDIT_BANK 0.0004
(0.001)
OVERALL_FREEDOM -0.0228***
(0.007)
N 121 120 95
 
Notes: This table reports the third-stage estimation. The XTFEVD estimator allows time-invariant and rarely 
changing variables to be estimated along with country-fixed effects. The coefficients represent marginal effects. For 
data descriptions, see Table 1. N is the number of observations, and a, b and c denote the different models that were 
estimated. Asterisks denote significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: For data sources, see Table 1. 
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8. Conclusions 
In this report, we study whether the presence of credit registers (public credit registers and 
private credit bureaus) has an impact on bank entry mode in Europe. Considering that financial 
market integration has been a major objective of policy-making in Europe, an answer to the 
question of how credit registers affect international entry patterns appears to be long overdue. 
Additionally, we also look at the effects of credit registers on banking market concentration and 
on competition indicators. Indeed, information asymmetries can constitute severe barriers for 
foreign banks to enter markets, which may deter entry or force them to enter through M&As 
instead of branching. M&As, however, are likely to have different effects in terms of market 
structure and competition compared with branching, as the former do not add additional market 
players to the number of existing players in the market. 
To answer these questions, we have constructed a new dataset that exploits the diversity in 
credit reporting systems across the EU-27 member states, covering them over the period 1990–
2007. The establishment of this dataset is one of our main contributions. It is a cross-sectional 
time-series dataset on credit registers that enables some (cautious) conclusions to be drawn 
about causality through the application of a difference-in-differences analysis. The new dataset 
we have compiled merges data from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation, the ECB, the 
SDC Platinum database and ECRI. This dataset has enabled us to apply more advanced 
econometric techniques, such as univariate difference-in-differences analysis and a number of 
multivariate estimations. 
In analysing this database, we have obtained several interesting results. The univariate analysis 
shows that public credit registers  
•  increase the proportion of entries through branches,  
•  have a significant negative effect on market concentration (CR3), and  
•  contribute to the intensification of competition (measured by various indicators).  
These latter effects appear more pronounced for highly concentrated markets and in the new 
member states.  
Private credit bureaus, on the other hand, do not show significant effects on market structure, 
but just as in the case of public registers, they positively contribute to entry through branching 
by raising the share of the latter among overall cross-border entries. Some indications show that 
they may also contribute to the intensification of competition, which is again more pronounced 
for highly concentrated markets and new member states. 
In the course of our research, we encountered a number of challenges in compiling information 
on private credit bureaus – which indicates that in the future policy-makers should be pressing 
for more disclosure of information on private bureaus’ activities. For instance, it ought to be 
possible for the public to obtain precise information on what data items are stored in the credit 
bureaus as well as what fee structures are applied. The availability of such information would 
also enable better comparisons of the credit reporting systems in the different countries.  
In the multivariate analysis, we applied a selection of econometric estimation procedures to 
account for the time-series cross-country characteristics of the dataset and assorted kinds of 
information shared. We found that once we accounted for assorted other influence factors, the 
establishment of a public credit register in our specifications has a significant positive impact on 
cross-border branching. The establishment of a public register that shares negative information 
also reduces cross-border M&As and net interest rate margins (our proxy for competition) for 
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The picture for private credit bureaus is more ambiguous. Our results show a positive 
contribution to cross-border branching and a negative effect for cross-border mergers in the 
presence of a private credit bureau sharing negative information. But we did not find significant 
effects on NIMs, where negative effects are only displayed for the introduction of a second 
credit bureau in the market. Contrary to the case of a public register, the kinds of information 
exchanged through credit bureaus seem to be more important, with such information typically 
being gathered through a voluntary information-sharing mechanism (such that not all lenders in 
a country participate).  
Taken together, our results suggest that the introduction of credit bureaus tends to facilitate 
cross-border entry through branches and thereby make national banking markets more 
contestable. In particular, our analysis indicates that a public register plays a significant role, for 
all kinds of information shared, as does a private register that shares negative information. The 
results for a private bureau that shares positive information are more mixed and deserve further 
investigation. 
Therefore, countries that would like to strengthen competition in the banking sector could 
consider setting up a public credit register. There are only 14 countries in Europe that currently 
have such registers. Also, from the viewpoint of financial stability and for bank supervisory 
purposes, these registers are considered useful (which are usually the reasons they are 
introduced by central banks). 
The slightly more ambiguous effects of private bureaus also suggest that policy-makers may 
have to ensure that the information they allow to be shared is complete and up-to-date, and that 
these registers are not used in a discriminatory way to the detriment of foreign banks. 
Another important policy recommendation in this respect is that policy-makers ought to obtain 
better information about the quality of data stored in the credit registers. We believe that data 
quality, which is crucial for borrower risk assessment and banking competition, should be one 
of the chief interests in the supervision of credit registers in the future. 
Unequal patterns of market entry among banks across Europe can probably be diminished by 
reducing the exogenous information asymmetries, once credit information systems are 
harmonised to a greater extent in terms of the data they share. Efforts in this regard would 
probably provide some scope for action by the European Commission. But one of the main 
difficulties that policy-makers will encounter is the diversity of legal and business terms, such 
as bankruptcy or delinquencies. 
A number of open questions remain about the empirical effects of credit registers on banking. 
For instance, in some theoretical works it is suggested that banks could strategically use credit 
registers to deter direct entry. Yet such use would only be possible for private credit bureaus, as 
exchange through a public credit register is mandatory and the deviant behaviour of participants 
would be sanctioned by the central bank. Also, private bureaus have limited incentives to 
sanction violations because of their conflicts of interest (as banks are not only reporting on 
institutions, but are also the bureau’s clients).  
Future research could contribute to a better understanding of the horizontal and vertical relations 
that arise from credit reporting and whether these can be used strategically to reduce the quality 
of market access for competitors. In addition, the ability of credit bureaus to facilitate prudential 
regulation and the monitoring of systemic risk could be analysed in the face of the current crisis. 
Improved data collection by EU policy-makers on credit registers is essential, however, to 
enable a better-informed discussion about their (empirical) effects. | 39 
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